Ellen Muir

Ellen Muir is the Class of 1958 Career Development Assistant Professor and an Assistant Professor of Applied Economics at the MIT Sloan School of Management. Her research focuses on the behavior of firms with market power, utilizing tools from mechanism design to examine how powerful firms design and sell products, procure inputs, and hire workers. This work provides insights into optimal pricing, regulatory interventions, and property rights, shedding light on phenomena such as rationing and opaque pricing. Muir received her PhD in economics from Stanford University in 2022 and previously served as a Prize Fellow in economics, history, and politics at Harvard University.

Ellen Muir is a researcher in Microeconomic Theory, Mechanism Design, Market Design, and Industrial Organization. Her work explores topics such as monopoly pricing, optimal randomization, and market thickness. She investigates mechanisms for contracting, vertical control, and labor procurement under minimum wages. Her research also addresses property rights, auction design, and the impact of market power on regulation. Muir's publications include studies on optimal Hotelling auctions, multi-product monopoly pricing, and the role of information in industrial organization. Her contributions focus on understanding how market structures and mechanisms influence economic outcomes and efficiency.