Robert Gibbons

Robert Gibbons is the Sloan Distinguished Professor of Management and Professor of Applied Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is affiliated with the ECON department and specializes in Organizational Economics. His research focuses on the design and performance of organized activities within and between firms, as well as beyond firms, such as hospitals and schools. He studies relational contracts, which are informal agreements that cannot be enforced by courts. His work explores the challenges of building, managing, and changing shared understandings that underpin these contracts. Gibbons is also involved in various academic initiatives, including the NBER working group in organizational economics and the CASBS summer institute on organizations and their effectiveness.

Robert Gibbons is a Professor of Organizational Economics at MIT Sloan and the Economics Department. His research focuses on Organizational Economics, with a particular emphasis on the design of incentive contracts, relational contracts, and the theory of the firm. His work explores how career concerns, subjective performance measures, and informal authority influence organizational behavior and decision-making. He has contributed extensively to understanding wage dynamics, promotion structures, and the role of relational contracts in shaping organizational capabilities. His publications often integrate game theory and empirical evidence to analyze incentives within and between firms.