Alexander Bloedel

Alexander Bloedel is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of California, Los Angeles. His research focuses on information economics, mechanism design, dynamic games, and bounded rationality, with recent work examining costly information acquisition and processing in both single-agent and strategic contexts. His studies also address dynamic incentive problems with applications in macroeconomics and political economy. Prior to joining UCLA, he was a Linde Postdoctoral Scholar at Caltech and earned his Ph.D. from Stanford University.

Alexander W. Bloedel is a microeconomic theorist whose work explores the implications of information asymmetry and inattention in economic decision-making. His research focuses on how agents process information and how this affects outcomes in insurance, inequality, and legislative dynamics. Bloedel's publications examine the cost of acquiring information, the persistence of private information, and the role of persuasion in economic contexts. His work often employs advanced mathematical models to analyze strategic behavior under informational constraints. Bloedel's research contributes to understanding how institutions and policies can mitigate the effects of asymmetric information.